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Foreword 
With the election complete, the uncertainty around 
whether or not Brexit will happen has ended, 
although questions on Scotland’s constitutional 
future remain. While there are some big questions 
as to the form Brexit will take, the result has 
provided greater clarity on the UK’s political outlook 
and with the return of a majority government, 
there is the opportunity to focus on the post-
Brexit challenges the country faces, including 
strengthening the building blocks of the economy 
and unlocking business investment. 
This concludes a year which, as highlighted in 
the Commentary, is currently on track to have the 
slowest global growth since the financial crisis. 
Looking to Scotland and the UK, it is a similar 
picture with UK annual growth remaining weak at 
1.0% p.a. and underlying momentum in the Scottish 
and UK economies set to remain fragile in 2020.  
Investment levels have remained consistently weak 
since 2017 and this has been compounded by the 
context of a global slowdown and ongoing Brexit 
uncertainties. 
Despite this, there are positive trends to 
acknowledge: unemployment levels remain at 
historic lows at 3.8% in the UK and 4% in Scotland 
and earnings are rising given the tight labour 
market.  Furthermore, during the election all 
political parties promised to significantly increase 
public investment and this should have a positive 
economic impact in the years ahead.
1 Power Up: UK-Wide Growth - https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/regions/articles/power-up-uk-wide-growth.html
2 For more information, see Deloitte, 2020 predictions for UK Technology, Media and Telecommunications
3 For more information, see Deloitte, Scotland's digital potential with enhanced 4G and 5G capability
Looking to the future, it is crucial that Scotland’s 
businesses work with educators and policymakers 
to ensure that people develop the skills that are 
vital in the face of advancing technology, AI and 
robotic capabilities. These were key takeaways 
from Deloitte’s Power Up survey issued in 20181, 
and are still relevant today, particularly when 
the opportunities afforded by the roll-out of 5G 
technology are considered. 
As outlined in Deloitte’s 2020 predictions for UK 
Technology, Media and Telecommunications2, 5G 
is set to become the technology of choice in the 
next decade. By enabling every machine and tool 
to become connected, it will, for example, allow 
factories to go wireless, enabling the reinvention of 
processes and business models. It will also allow 
new ways of working; consider fast and reliable 
remote control which makes it possible to operate 
machinery from a safe or comfortable place. That 
could be tractors or drones on farms, diggers on 
remote construction sites, or inspection cameras 
along huge power-lines. In a sparsely populated 
country like Scotland, there should be significant 
potential benefits.
For Scotland, the impact of this was outlined in 
a recent report commissioned by the Scottish 
Futures Trust3. The results show that enhanced 5G 
capabilities have the potential to increase Scottish 
GDP by £17 billion by 2035 through the creation 
of jobs in innovative new services and supporting 
increased levels of inward investment from the 
private sector. 
Deloitte supports the production of the Fraser Economic Commentary. It has no control over its editorial content, 
including in particular the Institute’s economic forecasts.
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This is not without its challenges, as currently 
various stakeholders across the private and public 
sectors are working on a number of initiatives in 
isolation. With significant benefits for the nation 
on the horizon, it is important that public and 
private sectors bring together their experience and 
resources to ensure that Scotland fully realises its 
potential4.  
Within the context of a confirmed Brexit, Scottish 
public policy will also have to address the potential 
challenges posed by the end of freedom of 
movement. Scotland’s modest forecast population 
increase is dependent on continued levels of 
inward migration, and the Commentary is right to 
acknowledge that a cycle of fewer young people, 
fewer births, shrinking populations, and smaller 
economies poses a risk to the sustainability of many 
communities. 
In the last few years Scotland’s economy has proven 
resilient to recession, and it is expected that we 
will be able to take some comfort in the latest GDP 
figures when they are published later this week. 
However, given the likelihood of continued political 
uncertainty in Scotland, this is no time to become 
complacent. Looking towards 2020, it is critical that 
both the private and public sectors coordinate their 
approaches to capitalise on potential opportunities, 
increase investment and support the creation 
of skilled jobs for all demographics working in 
Scotland.
John Macintosh  
Tax Partner 
Deloitte
December 2019
4 Deloitte, Scotland's digital potential with enhanced 4G and 5G capability
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The securing of a majority by the Conservatives 
in last week’s election has been interpreted – at 
least initially – by financial markets as a moment of 
clarity, with both sterling and the FTSE rising. 
Here in Scotland, the success of the Scottish 
National Party has ensured that the prospects of a 
second independence referendum remain front and 
centre in the debate. 
The outcome makes certain that the UK is on course 
to leave the EU on 31st January.
However, leaving the EU next month only marks one 
step on the road to understanding the long-term 
future direction of the UK economy. 
The tricky business of a trade negotiation now gets 
underway. 
What will happen at the end of the transition period 
on 31st December 2020? Will the UK Government be 
able to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement? 
What frictions could exist? And how might all this 
impact upon businesses here in Scotland? 
The experience of the last three and a half years 
suggests that it may not be smooth sailing. 
Yes, one element of recent uncertainty has been 
removed, but much still remains. 
The underlying performance of the UK and Scottish 
economies continues to be a concern. Growth 
returned to the UK economy in Q3 2019, but more 
recent figures published last week show growth now 
flatlining at best. 
Scottish GDP data is published tomorrow: 
expectations are that this will show positive but 
subdued growth over the year to September. 
Scotland and the UK are not unique in this regard. 
2019 is set to be the weakest year for global growth 
since the financial crisis. 
Summary
Given recent data, we have reduced our forecast for 
2019 slightly to 0.9%. 
But with the immediate risk of a ‘no deal’ now 
removed, our forecasts for 2020-2022 are slightly 
better, at 1.3% for 2020 and 1.4% for 2021 and 
2022. This of course, assumes that a UK-EU trade 
deal is agreed during 2020. If not, growth could slow 
sharply toward the tail end of next year. 
Understandably, the election was dominated by 
debates around Brexit. Broader discussions about 
the future direction of our economy – on issues 
such as inequalities, productivity or the climate 
emergency – were crowded out. 
And for all the talk we hear about ‘outcomes’ and 
‘wellbeing’, the political narrative in Scotland once 
again returned to the same tired format of which 
party was promising to spend the most (or least) on 
public services or tax the most (or least). 
The upcoming Budgets in both the UK and Scotland 
provide an opportunity for policymakers in 
government – and in opposition – to re-start a more 
informed debate and to set out their plans for the 
economy and public services in the years to come. 
As part of this, Mr Mackay has promised to produce 
an assessment of how his Budget contributes 
to wellbeing in Scotland, a welcome but not 
straightforward task (particularly if it is to avoid 
being simply a PR exercise). 
To help it is likely that he will benefit from significant 
Barnett consequentials coming from new UK 
Government spending commitments, which will be 
a welcome offset given that the Scottish Budget may 
face further difficult income tax reconciliations next 
year.
Fraser of Allander Institute 
December 2019
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At a glance
2020 2021 2022
GDP 1.3 1.4 1.4
Production 1.1 0.9 1.3
Construction 0.6 0.9 1.0
Services 1.4 1.5 1.5
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FAI forecast Scottish labour market indicators
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%) Year Change Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 74.4 ▼ 4.0 ▲
England 76.5 ▲ 3.9 ▼
Wales 73.9 ▼ 3.8 ▼
N. Ireland 72.3 ▲ 2.5 ▼
UK 76.0 ▲ 3.8 ▼
2020 2021 2022
Employment rate (%) 74.9 74.6 74.6
Unemployment Rate (%) 4.1 4.2 4.2
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Outlook and Appraisal
With the immediate risk of ‘no deal’ removed, the short-term prospects for the economy look brighter 
than in October. But risks remain. All of this sets the backdrop for the quick turnaround now needed in 
the UK/Scottish budgets, where we will find out just how key election pledges translate into actual policy 
commitments.  
Chart 1: Scottish growth since 2014 - year and quarter %
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Source: Scottish Government
Chart 2: Average annual growth in Scottish GDP, 1973 – 2018
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Chart 3: Outlook for the Scottish resource budget excluding social 
security, £m 2019/20 prices
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Introduction
The outcome of the general election has given us 
some clarity on the immediate direction of travel for 
UK economic policy over the next couple of months. 
The balance within parliament is such that the UK is 
on track to leave the EU at the end of January. 
However, whilst there may be some easing of short-
term uncertainty, key decisions and negotiations 
have still only been delayed for a few months. 
Crucially, the end date for the transitional exit of the 
UK from the EU is December 2020.
By then, the UK will need to have secured a 
comprehensive trade agreement with the EU to 
avoid a ‘no deal’ outcome.  
This means that – unfortunately – a period of 
uncertainty remains for the foreseeable future. 
Whether or not the events of the past week will be 
enough to unlock delayed investment for example, 
remains to be seen. 
All of this makes judging the outlook for the UK and 
Scottish economies tricky to assess. 
One thing that will help boost demand – at least 
in the short-run – is the promised increase in 
government spending now pencilled in for this year 
and next. 
We expect that the UK Budget will take place early in 
2020, with the Scottish Budget soon after. 
Barnett consequentials will give Derek Mackay 
considerably more flexibility than he may have 
envisaged just a few months ago. However, he will 
still have the complication of around £200 million of 
income tax reconciliations to contend with. 
One key challenge he faces – and parliament 
faces too – is that the budget process will have to 
happen over a constrained timescale, at a time 
when scrutiny matters more than ever. The situation 
Holyrood finds itself in is clearly regrettable. The 
timing of the Budget process – and the dependence 
of the Scottish Budget on UK decisions  – must be 
looked at as part of the Fiscal Framework review.  
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Table 1: IMF forecast growth rates (%), 2018 to 2022
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
UK 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5
US 2.9 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.6
Japan 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5
Canada 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.7
Germany 1.5 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.3
France 1.7 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4
Italy 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.7
Euro Area 1.9 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4
World 3.6 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.6
Source: IMF Economic Outlook 
Chart 4: Slowing global trade in merchandise growth
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Chart 5: Global foreign direct investment, 2006 – 2018
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The global economy
In our autumn economic commentary, we discussed 
how the outlook for the global economy had 
weakened throughout 2019. 
In the months since, there has been little change in 
this assessment. 2019 is on track to be the year with 
the slowest global growth since the financial crisis. 
Table 1. 
The slowdown is comprehensive, with most key 
markets on track to grow more slowly this year than 
last.  
As we discussed in October, the slowdown has had 
its greatest impact on international trade – Chart 4 – 
and investment – Chart 5. 
There are some tentative signs that the outlook may 
have eased. Confidence in the Euro Area has been 
helped by Germany avoiding a ‘technical’ recession 
(just). Inflation has surprised on the upside in 
Europe, all adding to a belief that the European 
economy is stabilising. 
The pace of the US economy’s expansion has picked 
up in the back half of 2019, with the economy 
expanding at a 2.1 per cent annualised rate in the 
3-months to September, up on both the initial 
estimate for that time and on the previous 3 months.
However, this does not disguise the ongoing 
structural weak performance in advanced economies 
over time. As Jim Walker’s Asianomics recent 
analysis clearly shows the performance of the 
world’s so-called advanced economies has been 
well below-par now for over a decade.
Chart 6: Real annualised GDP growth by decade, 1980 – 2018
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Chart 7: US Treasury yield curve, 10-year vs 3-month, 2019
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Chart 8: GDP growth in Hong Kong, Q3 2018 – Q3 2019
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Chart 9: Contractor optimism in UKCS, 2011 – May/Oct 2019
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This has been driven by structural challenges but 
also numerous policy failures. Chart 6.
Where might activity go next?
Over the years, the US yield curve has been seen as 
a key barometer of the outlook for the US economy, 
with previous US recessions accompanied by an 
inverted yield curve. The US yield curve did display 
a recession-warning indication in the autumn, but 
since then it has bounced back. Chart 7.
More generally, emerging markets and middle-
income economies continue to drive much of 
the growth in the global economy – once again 
highlighting the importance of such markets to 
Scotland over the long-term. 
The obvious exception has been Hong Kong where 
the unrest has had a severe impact on its economy. 
Chart 8. 
Despite the uncertainty, financial markets have 
continued to post positive returns. Oil prices remain 
relatively constant around the $60 mark. Our latest 
survey of the oil and gas industry in Scotland 
suggests that sentiment remains relatively positive 
despite heightened levels of uncertainty. Chart 9.
A particularly interesting finding this time was the 
modest growth in the number of firms exploring new 
energy – particularly low carbon – technologies. 
Chart 10.
See our last commentary for a discussion about the 
transition to a low carbon economy in Scotland, and 
the opportunities and risks that this will provide. 
Chart 10: Contractors involved in renewables in next 3-5 years, 
2018 – 2019
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Chart 11: UK real GDP growth, Q1 2008 – Q3 2019
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Chart 12: Composition of UK economic growth, Q1 2017 – Q3 
2019
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Chart 13: UK manufacturing growth, Q1 2017 – Q3 2019
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The UK economy
The UK returned to growth in the third quarter of the 
year, with activity increasing 0.3% – after a decline 
of 0.2% the previous quarter. 
Whilst welcome, the pace of growth was slower than 
many analysts – including in the Bank of England – 
had predicted.  
Underlying momentum in the UK economy remains 
fragile. Annual growth is just 1.0% - the weakest 
since early 2010. 
Over the last two quarters, the economy has grown 
by just 0.1% - with services leading the way, growing 
by 0.5%. Chart 12.
Services increased by 0.4%, following the weakest 
quarterly figure in 3 years in Q2. 
Over the summer, the effects of Brexit stockpiling 
were much less pronounced than earlier on in the 
year. 
The strong built up of inventories in the run-up to 
the 31st March deadline, distorted the UK’s growth 
figures – with manufacturing output particularly 
volatile. Chart 13.
Business investment continues to remain weak. 
Investment was flat over the summer, continuing 
the trend of exceptionally weak performance – with 
investment flat (or falling) since 2017. Chart 14.
Wider evidence suggests that this trend is likely to 
have continued into the final few months of the year
The latest Bank of England Agents’ survey has found 
that investment intentions amongst UK businesses 
is now at a nine-year low.
 
Chart 14: UK business investment, Q1 2009 – Q3 2019
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Chart 15: UK trade balance, Q3 2017 – Q3 2019
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Chart 16: Output per hour with pre/post-downturn 25th, 50th 
and 75th percentiles, Q1 1998 – Q2 2019
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The percentiles indicate the percentage of observations where the 
quarterly growth rates are beneath a specified point.
Chart 17: Composition of UK output growth, Q1 2008 – Q2 2019
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The UK’s trade balance – which has been 
consistently negative (i.e. we import more than 
we export) – improved a little over the summer, 
although non-official statistics suggest that 
conditions may be more challenging than these 
figures suggest (particularly in the light of ongoing 
global trade tensions). 
Much has been made of the UK’s trade deficit and 
how it may change post-Brexit. 
Interestingly, the UK has a relatively ‘strong’ trade 
surplus with the rest of the world, but it is on goods 
where it has a deficit. The improvement over the 
last year has come from both an improvement in 
the services surplus and a weakening in the goods 
deficit. 
We know that levels of internationalisation and 
investment are key drivers of productivity in the 
long-run. 
The UK’s productivity puzzle shows no sign of being 
resolved. 
Labour productivity in the UK fell over the summer, 
having been effectively flat through the start of the 
year.
Productivity growth remains well below trend. Chart 
16. 
Much of the weakness in UK productivity stems from 
weak growth in multi-factor productivity.  
Any growth we have seen in the UK economy has 
largely stemmed from more people working (and 
working harder), and modest increases in the 
country’s capital stock rather than any underlying 
improvement in productivity performance. Chart 17.
UK labour market indicators
Unemployment in the UK continues to be close to 
near record lows. 
Over the quarter to September, unemployment in 
the UK fell to just 3.8%. Whilst changes from month-
to-month can be volatile, the direction of travel is 
clearly into almost unparalleled territory. 
UK employment now stands at 76%. 
During the financial crisis and its aftermath, the 
number of people working part-time increased 
sharply. 
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Chart 18: UK unemployment rate (16+), 1971 – Jul/Sep 2019
Source: ONS (LFS)
Table 2: UK labour market transition rates, Q2 2019 – Q3 2019
Q3 2019
Employment Unemployment Inactivity
Q2
 2
01
9 Employment 97% 0.9% 1.8%
Unemployment 31.3% 48.1% 19.7%
Inactivity 6.4% 4.3% 88.5%
Source: ONS (LFS)
Chart 19: GB average weekly earnings, annual growth rate (%), 
Jul/Sep 2001 – Jul/Sep 2019
Source: ONS
Does this still lie behind the recent surge in 
employment?
No. In fact in recent times, the number of people 
working part-time has fallen back. 
The number of part-time workers fell by 164,000 to 
8.54 million in Quarter 3 2019, while the number 
of full-time workers increased by 106,000 to 24.21 
million. 
The flow of workers in an out of unemployment 
has started to become more dynamic. Nearly 1 in 3 
people who were unemployed in the three months 
to June were in employment during the subsequent 
quarter. 
In contrast, only 6% of those economically inactive 
found employment. Table 2. 
In light of the tight labour market, and despite 
limited productivity growth in the economy, it is no 
surprise that earnings have been on a steady rise. 
Chart 19. 
Indeed, this has been the largest sustained increase 
in earnings since the financial crisis. 
Vacancies have also been on the rise (although 
they have fallen back in recent times) adding to 
the pressure building on wage growth. What is 
particularly interesting is the growth in vacancies 
within particular sectors. These trends over time can 
help identify wider structural challenges within the 
labour market. 
Consistent with wider trends – particularly around 
increased demand – pressures appear to be growing 
and particularly acute in the caring professions. 
Chart 20.
Chart 20: Vacancies in health and social services, Aug/Oct 2010 
– Aug/Oct 2019
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Chart 21: Net % of CFOs that think it is a good time to be taking 
greater risk onto balance sheets
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Chart 22: Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) for the UK, Jan 2016 
– Nov 2019
Source: IHS Markit
Chart 23: CBI measures of confidence for the UK, Q1 2015 – Q4 
2019
Source: CBI
UK outlook
The outlook for the UK Economy remains fairly 
uncertain, even despite the outcome of the general 
election. 
Early indicators for Q4 are not promising: the latest 
monthly data for October showed no (0.0%) growth 
in aggregate, with weak 0.2% growth in services and 
manufacturing being offset by a significant (-2.3%) 
contraction in construction. 
Away from the official data, most measures of 
confidence and current activity levels remain – at 
best – subdued. 
The latest Deloitte survey of Chief Financial Officers 
in UK corporates shows a continued reluctance 
to take on risk. Chart 21. Q4’s CBI survey shows 
confidence has continued to fall and is now almost 
at the level it was at after the EU Referendum in 
2016. Chart 23. 
We have said before that it is possible that in 
such times the link between surveys – particularly 
measures of confidence – and day-to-day activity 
may not be perfect. 
But it is undoubtedly the case that the economic 
situation has impacted on investment and 
dampened growth. Chart 24.
The hope must now be that with the General Election 
now resolved – whether you agree or disagree 
with the outcome – there is an opportunity for 
some stability to return to the underlying policy 
environment.
Chart 24: OECD forecasts of UK, Euro Area and US economic 
growth
Source: OECD
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Scottish Economy Dashboard
Annual 
Growth*
5-Year Average 
Annual Growth Key trends 
 ■ The production sector felt the effect of stockpiling 
the most in Q2, with growth contracting -1.5%.
 ■ The sector was the biggest contributor to the 
contraction in growth in Q2 2019.
-1.4% 0.6%Production
Level Change over  year Key trends
* Quarter on same quarter a year ago. 
** Experimental statistics.
1.2% 1.2%
 ■ The services sector grew by 0.2% in both the first 
and second quarter of 2019.
 ■ In the last year, the bulk of the services sector's 
growth has been driven by financial services.
Services
-1.1% 3.0%
 ■ The second quarter of 2019 saw the first 
contraction in growth since Q1 2018, bringing the 
period of sustained growth to an end. 
Construction
-0.6% -0.6%
 ■ Agriculture recovered from last quarter when 
annual growth was -2.8%, however, growth in this 
sector remained fragile into the second quarter of 
the year.
Agriculture
-1.0% 2.9%  ■ Exports slipped back in the first two quarters of 2019, after strong growth last year.Exports**
-8.3% 2.5%
 ■ Business investment declined further in Q2 2019 
after a turbulent year in 2018.
 ■ Brexit uncertainty continues to halt investment 
and the latest data indicates that investment in 
the first two quarters of 2019 was deeply affected.
Business 
Investment**
1.3% 1.4%  ■ Productivity (output per hour) increased by 0.2% in Q2 2019.Productivity
Employment 74.4%  -0.5pp  ■ Employment fell by 1 percentage point in Q3, with 43,000 fewer people in employment than Q2.
4.0%  0.2ppUnemployment  ■ Unemployment increased by 0.4 percentage points in Q3.
0.6% 1.2%
 ■ There was a contraction in growth of -0.2% in Q2 
after growth of 0.5% in Q1. 
 ■ The effects of the unwinding of stockpiling seen in 
Q1 are now evident. 
GDP
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Chart 25: Composition of economic growth in Scotland, Q1 2016 
– Q2 2019
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Chart 26: Real terms quarterly business investment, 2016 base 
year
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Chart 27: Q1 2019 Regional GDP growth rates for England and 
Wales, compared to Scotland
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The Scottish economy
Following the same pattern as at the UK level, there 
was a contraction in Q2 in Scottish GDP which 
appeared to be driven by stockpiling in advance of 
the original Brexit deadline. 
Q3 data will be published tomorrow: the 
expectations are that this will show that positive, 
but rather weak growth has returned to the Scottish 
economy.
Since the EU Referendum, services has contributed 
most to growth in the Scottish economy. Out of 
total  growth of 3.9%: Services accounted for 3.3%, 
Production only 0.4% and Construction 0.2%.
In other words, despite making up 76% of the 
economy, services has accounted for 84% of growth. 
Two sectors, finance & insurance and retail & 
wholesale, accounted for almost half of services 
growth over that period.
Like the UK, business investment has fallen steadily 
in the last few quarters, and is now below the level 
of Q2 2016 in real terms. Chart 26.
Often, Scottish economic data is compared to 
data for the UK as a whole. Sometimes there is the 
justified criticism that UK figures are skewed by the 
performance of London and the South East.
ONS have recently released a new experimental 
statistics publication which estimates GDP growth 
for the 9 English regions and Wales. 
These data are an excellent development, and when 
they become more established, will provide a useful 
comparator for the Scottish data currently produced 
by the Scottish Government, and the data produced 
for Northern Ireland by NISRA.
These data are still in development and should 
therefore be used and interpreted with caution, but 
the early results show the differential growth rates 
for Q1 2019. Chart 27. 
In many of the quarters published so far, London 
has the highest growth rates, although the data are 
currently fairly volatile. It will be interesting to see 
how this product develops over the coming months. 
As it becomes more established we are likely to 
produce further analysis of this data on our blog.
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Chart 28: Volume of Retail Sales in Scotland and GB
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Chart 29: Retail sales in Scotland, large and small businesses, 
2016 Q1 – 2019 Q3
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Chart 30: Retail Sales Volume Growth in Scotland, 2008 – 2019
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Retail Sales In Scotland
This section was written by Freya Buchanan, a 6th year high 
school pupil, who carried out work experience at the Fraser of 
Allander Institute as part of our Economic Futures initiative.
Over the past decade, one feature of the recovery 
from the Great Recession, has been the strong 
growth in household consumption (despite weak 
growth in earnings). 
As a result, retail sales have continued to perform 
better than some other sectors. But there are clearly 
challenges underlying these headline trends. 
One feature in the data is that Scotland’s retail 
sector has been lagging behind the rest of GB. 
Another is that the rise of online shopping has 
caused the high street to undergo radical changes 
with internet sales as a % of total retail sales in GB 
increasing from just 3% in 2007 to 18% in 2018. 
All of this has created challenges for Scotland’s 
retail sector and in particular for Scotland’s small 
and medium firms. 
During the financial crisis, and its immediate 
aftermath, the performance of Scotland’s retail 
sector was broadly in line with that of GB. 
As the volume of sales began to recover in 2013 a 
significant divergence soon appeared, with Scottish 
sales lagging behind the rest of GB. Chart 28. 
Over the past few years, small and medium 
businesses have experienced fairly volatile growth 
as high as 3.2% in Q1 2018 and as low as -2.1%. 
We can see that typically larger businesses do not 
experience such volatility and unpredictability in 
sales volume. Chart 29. 
The effects of the Great Recession are still being 
felt by small businesses in Scotland. The volume 
of retail sales for small and medium businesses in 
the latest quarter remains 5% lower than in the first 
quarter of 2008. In contrast, large businesses have 
expanded their sales volume by 15% during the 
same period. Chart 30.
With the rise of online shopping and ongoing 
pressures on earnings, it may not be unreasonable 
to conclude that small retailers in Scotland appear 
to have been left behind.
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Chart 31: Price of oil, US $ / BBL, Jan 2013 – Dec 2019
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Chart 32: Mining & Quarrying and Mining Support as a 
percentage of the Scottish economy
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Chart 33: Supply chain linkages to the onshore economy, 2014
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The Oil and Gas sector
With the more fragile outlook for the global economy 
and ongoing geopolitical tensions, it is no surprise 
that the price of oil has remained relatively subdued 
at around $60 a barrel. Chart 31.
The North Sea remains an important part of 
Scotland’s industrial base, with extraction activity 
and mining support services alone making up 
almost 15% of activity in the Scottish economy. 
Chart 32. 
And this does not even include the significant 
supply chain activity which supports the industry, 
particularly in areas such as metals manufacture, 
engineering and water transport services. 
In the last couple of years, the Scottish Government 
has produced experimental statistics which try to 
estimate the linkages between Scotland’s offshore 
and onshore economies. 
Whilst still in development, these statistics are an 
excellent insight into the linkages between the North 
Sea and the day-to-day onshore Scottish economy. 
Chart 33. In time, a full ‘satellite account’ will be a 
welcome development, helping to understand key 
questions around trade flows and value added. 
Of course, the transition to net zero provides 
significant challenges for the oil and gas sector, but 
also tremendous opportunities. 
On any deliverable transition plan, the North Sea will 
continue to play a key role in UK energy needs for 
the foreseeable future. But the demands to shift into 
new sources of energy will only increase. 
As discussed above, our latest survey of the industry 
suggests that confidence has increased in recent 
months, with the outlook for international work 
being particularly positive. 
Looking ahead, 86% of companies said they 
expected to be involved in decommissioning, and 
61% in renewables in the next three to five years. 
The latest report also highlights the challenges 
faced in recruiting and retaining skilled workers. 
Following the loss of many workers during the oil 
price fall in 2015, coupled with Brexit uncertainty 
and issues around some people’s perceptions of the 
industry, this remains a top concern for oil and gas 
companies. 
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Table 3: Scottish/UK Labour markets, Jul-Sep 2019
Employment 
(16-64)
Unemployment 
(16+)
Inactivity 
(16-64)
Scotland (%) 74.4 4.0 22.4
Quarterly change 
(p.p.)
-1.0 0.4 0.8
Annual change 
(p.p.)
-0.5 0.2 0.4
UK (%) 76.0 3.8 20.8
Quarterly change 
(p.p.)
-0.1 -0.1 0.1
Annual change 
(p.p.)
0.5 -0.2 -0.3
Source: ONS (LFS)
Chart 34: Employment and unemployment rate in Scotland, Jul-
Sep 2010 – Jul-Sep 2019
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Chart 35: 16-24 employment and unemployment rate in 
Scotland, Jul 2010 - Jun 2011 – Jul 2018 - Jun 2019
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Scottish labour market and productivity
Scotland’s unemployment rate currently sits at 4%, 
near a record low. 
The rate in Scotland is slightly above that of the 
UK as a whole and higher than England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. Table 3.  However, these 
differences are small and not statistically significant. 
At the same time the employment rate in Scotland 
remains relatively high, although it has fallen back 
in the recent data, with 22,000 fewer people in 
Scotland than the year before. 
The impressive inroads that were made in reducing 
youth (16 – 24-year-old) unemployment in 
Scotland appear to have plateaued with the youth 
unemployment rate up 0.8% points in the year to 
June 2019, and flat over the past two years. Chart 35. 
For those in work, the last few years have seen rising 
trends in the number of people in both part-time and 
full-time work. 
But in the latest data the trend appears to be 
towards faster growth in full-time employment. Chart 
36. 
Interestingly however, the growth in hours worked 
has flatlined. This means that the key driver of 
growth in recent times has been – albeit modest – 
improvements in productivity. Chart 37.
As a result, firms have been able to meet higher 
demand without increasing hours worked. 
Chart 36: Full-time and part-time workers, Jul 2010 - Jun 2011 = 
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Chart 37: Growth in Scottish GVA, hours (inverted) and output 
per hour, Index Q1 2014 = 100, Q1 2014 – Q2 2019
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Chart 38: Residents who are Employees - % in quality work, 
2018
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Chart 39: Annual earnings in Scotland and UK, % change, April 
2018 – April 2019
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The ONS have recently released a publication which 
provides the first exploratory analysis of indicators 
of the quality of jobs. A "good job" is one that has:
 ■ good hours: employees working 48 or fewer 
hours a week and not wishing to work more 
hours in their current role or look for an 
additional job or a replacement job that 
offers more hours
 ■ a desired contract type: employees either in 
a permanent contract or who did not accept a 
non-permanent contract because they could 
not find a permanent one
 ■ a position not in low pay: employees who 
are earning above two-thirds of the hourly 
median pay; this analysis has been done 
both at UK level and in local areas of 
residence
Results are provided for regions of the UK, equality 
characteristics and industry. For example, we can 
see the pattern across Scottish LAs. Chart 38 shows 
the results for Scottish local authorities. 
It shows that on this indicator, some parts of the 
country that show strong growth, and high incomes, 
may not be the best in terms of overall job quality, 
for example, Aberdeen and Edinburgh. This is 
something that we will return to in the future.
Since the last commentary we have new data on 
earnings from the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE). 
These show that growth in annual earnings 
remained rather muted over the year in real terms.  
But in a welcome turnaround on recent times, 
earnings grew slightly more quickly in Scotland than 
in the UK between 2018 and 2019. 
Interestingly, earnings in the top half of the 
distribution grew more quickly, whilst earnings in 
the bottom half of the distribution grew less quickly, 
in Scotland than in the UK. 
On the one hand this poses a challenge, as it means 
inequalities will have increased more quickly in 
Scotland than in the UK last year (although overall 
inequality remains lower in Scotland). 
On the other hand, given that higher earners 
typically pay more tax, one upside is that this 
could signal that devolved income tax revenues in 
Scotland may perform better than has been forecast. 
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Chart 40: Population projections for Scotland up to 2043
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Chart 41: Age profile for Scotland, 2018, 2030 and 2043
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Chart 42: Projected change in population by EU country, 2018 – 
2043
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Scotland’s population outlook
In October, the latest projections for Scotland’s 
population were published by National Records of 
Scotland. 
The figures confirm that whilst Scotland’s population 
is projected to grow over the next 25 years from 
around 5.4 to 5.6 million, the pace of growth is 
projected to slow and then level off. Chart 40.
Our population will also continue to age. 
In 2001, the median average age in Scotland was 39. 
By 2017, that had risen to 42. In 20 years time that 
will rise to around 45. 
Our current age profile has a relatively large peak 
around 70 years old (the post-war baby boomers) 
and then a bulge of people in their early to mid-50s 
(the children of the baby boomers). Chart 41.
As these people age, with higher life expectancy 
than in previous generations, they are projected to 
make up a growing proportion of the population. 
Planned increases to the state pension age will help 
protect Scotland’s working age population – at least 
for the foreseeable future – but in time it will start to 
fall back. 
However, Scotland is not unique in facing such 
challenges. 
These latest projections put Scotland pretty much on 
the average in Europe. 
Some of the changes – particularly in Eastern 
Europe are hugely significant. Interestingly, the UK 
bucks the trend. 
In contrast to an average EU and Scottish population 
growth of 2.5% over the next 25 years, the UK 
population is projected to rise by around 9%. 
And the UK’s working age population outlook is also 
healthier. 
It is important to separate out the different elements 
of population change.
It is estimated that in 2018, the number of deaths 
in Scotland exceeded births by around 8,000. The 
most recent projections are that as our population 
ages, this will rise to closer to 20,000 over the 
coming decades. 
This means that migration becomes absolutely 
crucial. Without migration - and at levels sufficient to 
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Chart 43: Change in working age population under different EU 
migration scenarios, 2018 to 2043
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Chart 44: Change in working age population by UK nation, 2018 
– 2043
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counterbalance this fall in Scotland’s natural change 
– Scotland’s population will decline. 
Average net migration in recent years from both the 
rest of the UK and overseas was around +21,000 
individuals a year. It is this that helps to maintain a 
stable population in Scotland according to the latest 
projections. 
Overseas migrants tend to be much younger than 
the population as a whole. 
To illustrate this, a 50% decline in EU net migration 
would see Scotland’s working age population fall by 
nearly 2% over the next 25 years, rising to nearly 4% 
if there was to be zero net EU migration. Chart 43. 
In contrast, for the UK as a whole, their working age 
population is projected to still rise even without EU 
migration. 
The picture within Scotland is extremely varied. The 
average age in Scotland is 42 today. In Dumfries & 
Galloway and the Western Isles it is 49. In Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, Aberdeen – and other cities with large 
student populations – it is in the mid-30s. Chart 44.
There are clear geographic patterns in age profiles 
across the country, with rural areas – and those of 
post-industrial decline – generally older than urban 
ones. Chart 45.
Many of the parts of the country with the oldest 
populations have also been rising at the fastest rate. 
A cycle of fewer young people; fewer births; 
shrinking populations; smaller economies, is a risk 
to the sustainability of many communities. 
Chart 45: Median age by local authority, 2017
Oldest and youngest local authorities
Dumfries and Galloway 48.9
Argyll and Bute 48.9
Na h-Eileanan Siar 48.5
Scottish Borders 48.4
South Ayrshire 48.2
…
Scotland average 42.0
…
West Lothian 40.8
Dundee City 37.1
Aberdeen City 36.7
City of Edinburgh 36.4
Glasgow City 35.6
Source: National Records of Scotland
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Table 4: Scottish business monitor headline results, Q3 2019
Q3 2019 Quarter change
Year 
change
FAI Business Activity 
Index (net % balance)
5 -9 ▼ -11 ▼
New business 3 -8 ▼ -12 ▼
Turnover 8 -5 ▼ -12 ▼
Costs 56 5 ▲ 2 ▲
New capital 
investment
-3 4 ▲ 8 ▲
Export activity -8 3 ▲ -8 ▼
Source: Scottish Business Monitor, FAI
Chart 46: Purchasing Manager's Index, Scotland & UK, Jan 2016 
– Nov 2019
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Chart 47: Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment Index, 
current conditions
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Latest Scottish indicators
The latest up-to-date indicators for Scotland are 
continuing to show a mixed and somewhat volatile 
picture. 
Our own measure of economic activity – the FAI 
Business Activity Index – fell during quarter 3, but 
remained in positive territory. Table 4. 
With the Q4 survey currently in the field, we will 
publish analysis in January which will show whether 
this pattern has continued - or if the reduction 
in short term uncertainty has helped to shore up 
confidence. 
The latest Purchasing Manager's Index for November 
does show signs of a slightly more optimistic 
picture. It is back in positive, expansive territory – 
only just – but it is a sign of the ongoing resilience of 
businesses in Scotland. Chart 46.
Interestingly the figure for Northern Ireland has got 
progressively worse in recent months and now lags 
other regions of the UK by a considerable distance. 
Consumer sentiment in Scotland has been in 
negative territory since the EU referendum. The 
most recent quarter showed a slight weakening of 
sentiment compared to Q2 2019, although this is 
now at a more positive level than it was in Q1 2019. 
Chart 47. 
Indicators on activity in the labour market remain 
in positive territory, suggesting that recruitment 
continues. However, the outlook has slipped back 
during 2019 to the level witnessed in the immediate 
aftermath of the EU referendum. Chart 48.
Chart 48: Employment Barometer, 2013 – Nov 2019
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Chart 49: FAI central forecast for 2019 – 2022
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
An
nu
al
 G
VA
 G
ro
w
th
Forecast
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Actual data to Q3 2019. Central forecast with forecast uncertainty for 
2019 – 2022. Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts 
at different forecast horizons.
Table 5: Fraser of Allander Central Forecasts (%)
2019 2020 2021 2022
Central Forecast 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.4
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Table 6: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy, %
2019 2020 2021
Bank of England 1.0 1.6 1.8
OBR 1.2 1.4 1.6
NIESR 1.4 1.4 1.5
European Commission 1.3 1.4 1.4
IMF 1.2 1.4 1.5
Oxford Economics 1.3 1.1 -
ITEM Club 1.3 1.0 1.5
CBI 1.3 1.2 1.8
Source: HM Treasury, Bank of England, OBR
Our forecasts
Economic forecasting at the current remains 
challenging, even in the light of some resolution 
to the recent uncertainty as a result of last week’s 
general election. 
As a result, all economic forecasts should be viewed 
with caution. It is difficult to quantify, for example, 
what the impacts could be should the negotiations 
on the new future UK-EU trade go badly. Although 
it does seem likely however, that with a large 
majority the new government will have much greater 
flexibility in the negotiations than was previously 
the case. 
On a positive note, we have long suspected that 
a significant amount of investment in the UK has 
been withheld until greater clarity was known about 
the UK’s economic future. With this gradually being 
resolved, this may help to unlock investment. 
In addition, we have the promise of a significant 
boost to spending from the new government over 
the next few years. How many of the spending 
pledges made during the election will bear out in the 
forthcoming UK Budget? What will their impact be 
on Scotland? And what sort of spending profile, in 
terms of timing, will they have? 
The immediate risk of a ‘no deal’ outcome has 
however, disappeared. We therefore – for the 
time being – return to presenting only our central 
forecast. There remains an unusually wide margin of 
error around these estimates and it should therefore 
be interpreted more of a mid-point of a range of 
possible outcomes at the current time. Chart 49.
Driving our results are a short-term uptick in the first 
half of 2020, followed by a further boost in 2021 
as a result of a degree of easing in the uncertainty 
leading to higher levels of investment and a boost 
to government spending. Depending on the scale 
of this boost to investment, this could lead to GDP 
growth surprising on the upside.
Of course, this does still assume that a 
comprehensive trade agreement is reached with the 
EU in the timescale set out by the Prime Minister. 
This is subject to significant uncertainty, particularly 
based upon previous experience.
On the other hand, global growth has weakened and 
could act as a drag on growth.
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Table 7:  FAI central forecast Scottish GDP growth 2020 to 2022
2020 2021 2022
GDP 1.3 1.4 1.4
Production 1.1 0.9 1.3
Construction 0.6 0.9 1.0
Services 1.4 1.5 1.5
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 8: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2021
2020 2021 2022
Employment rate1 74.9 74.6 74.6
Unemployment Rate2 4.1 4.2 4.2
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
1 Rate calculated as total employment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16-64.  
2 Rate calculated as total unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over.
Table 9: FAI Nowcasts for Scotland’s GDP, Q3 &Q4 2019
Q3 2019 Q4 2019
Quarterly Growth 0.21% 0.25%
Annualised growth 0.83% 0.99%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
We forecast growth of 1.3% in 2020, 1.4% in 2021 
and 1.4% in 2022. 
Overall, our forecasts are not that dissimilar to those 
for the UK as a whole – although there is admittedly 
significantly variation between forecasters. 
Our forecast for the production sector has been 
revised down following the decline in quarter 
2 and the continued weak sentiment amongst 
manufacturing firms. 
The Service sector is predicted to continue to 
grow slightly faster than the economy as a whole, 
continuing the trend of this becoming a larger part 
of our economy. We believe that much of this growth 
will continue to be led by financial and professional 
services, alongside continued growth in tourism 
related sectors. 
Public services should also pick-up as a result of 
growth in public spending. 
New Scottish Labour Market data is published 
today. Recent publications have shown a slight 
fall back in employment, and a slight increase in 
unemployment, compared to recent months. 
Our outlook is for this to continue over the next two 
years, as labour market indicators continue to move 
in the direction of more typical levels. 
This forecast will obviously also be dependent on 
confidence returning and business investment 
picking up from its current very low level. 
One helpful indicator to keep an eye on, to see just 
how much the latest developments may change the 
outlook is to look at our Scottish nowcasts. 
The Fraser of Allander Institute is at the cutting edge 
of developing innovative – and timelier – indicators 
of economic activity. These monthly “nowcasts” of 
the Scottish economy distil economic “noise” from 
hard and soft economic indicators to produce a 
robust near instantaneous assessment of growth in 
the Scottish economy. 
You can find the latest estimates of Scottish 
economic growth using the Fraser of Allander 
Institute Nowcasting model in Table 9. 
These figures for example, show that while the 
Scottish economy is unlikely to enter a technical 
recession in Q3 2019 – in line with the pattern at the 
UK level – growth will remain sluggish. 
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Policy context
The outlook for the Scottish budget 2020/21
Budget 2020/21 will be the fourth of five to be set 
in this parliament. Normally of course it would have 
been published by now – the Scottish Government 
initially planned to publish it on 12 December – and 
the process of scrutiny and debate on the proposals 
contained within it would have begun.
It was inevitable that the announcement of a UK 
General Election on 12 December resulted in the 
postponement of the Scottish budget. The outlook 
for the Scottish budget – and the viability and 
outcomes of tax and spending policies – is heavily 
dependent on UK Government policy decisions. 
A Scottish budget published in advance of knowing 
the complexion of the UK Government would have 
had to be underpinned by a range of caveats and 
uncertainties, and could have been subject to 
substantial revision once the UK Government’s plans 
became known with greater certainty.
The fact that the General Election result last week 
was so decisive has in a blink lifted much of the 
uncertainty that it existed, at least in the short run 
(i.e. for 2020/21).
The departmental spending plans of the 
Conservative Government for 2020/21 are unlikely 
to differ substantially from those set out in 
September’s Spending Round (and reiterated in the 
Conservative manifesto). There may be a few extra 
spending announcements here or there, but the UK 
Chancellor has little scope to announce anything 
significant given his stated fiscal rule and his party’s 
commitment to avoid tax increases. 
In principle the Chancellor could be dealt a helping 
hand by the OBR if it revises up its forecasts for UK 
economic growth. But the prospect of this seem 
unlikely in the context of economic data published 
since the OBR’s last forecasts in March this year (the 
March forecasts were made on the assumption that 
the UK exited the EU on terms not dissimilar from 
those negotiated by Mr. Johnson).
So, on the assumption that the UK Government’s 
spending plans do not differ materially from those 
set out in September, the implication is that the 
Scottish resource block grant will increase by around 
£1.1bn, or just over 2% in real terms in 2020/21.
However, the resources available to the Scottish 
Government may increase somewhat less than this 
for two reasons – one of which we have certainty on, 
the other is more uncertain.
 ■ First, the block grant will be reduced by 
£200m to reflect forecast error in relation 
to the income tax forecast for the 2017/18 
budget. Long lags between budget forecasts 
and income tax reconciliations are an 
unfortunate side effect of the new fiscal 
powers. 
 ■ Second, it seems likely that the SFC’s 
forecasts for Scottish income tax revenue 
growth in 2020/21 may point to somewhat 
less revenue being raised through this 
channel than in 2019/20. This is by no means 
a given, and it will depend on a variety of 
factors, including how the SFC choose to 
interpret recent (relatively positive) economic 
data for Scotland in the context of longer 
term trends. 
A central assumption therefore is that the Scottish 
Government’s resource budget will rise by around 
2% in real terms, assuming no major tax policy 
changes. This would take the Scottish budget to 
around 4% higher in real terms than in 2016/17. 
Whilst this is not a huge increase in a historic 
context (and the budget would remain some 3% 
lower than in the pre-austerity peak of 2010/11), it 
represents a marked improvement on the outlook 
Mr. Mackay faced at the end of 2016. Then, the 
outlook was for real terms decline in the block grant 
of over 3% to 2019/20.
On the spending side, we can expect a continuation 
of the trends in previous budgets of this parliament. 
Health spending is likely to increase 3 or 4 per cent 
in real terms. 
Alongside (much smaller) commitments on police, 
education and childcare, expect a further debate 
about the constraints faced by local government. In 
this context it will be interesting to see how much 
further the debate on local taxation gets. 
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Local authorities do have the power to set a 
‘workplace parking levy’ in their areas, and the 
Programme for Government included an intention 
to create a discretionary power to enable councils 
to introduce a tourist visitor levy. And as part of 
last year’s budget, the government committed to 
convene cross-party talks on replacing the current 
council tax – although we have of course been here 
several times before.
But the pace of reform on local government finance 
has been slow. This no doubt explains, in part why 
many now in Parliament are supporting the radical 
decision to devolve business rate setting to local 
authorities. There are clearly risks with such a move, 
and it should be part of a much wider discussion 
about the future of local government funding more 
generally rather than a policy in isolation.
As well as local government, some other spending 
areas have also been consistent losers so far this 
parliament, including universities, environment 
agencies, prisons, and some other elements of the 
justice portfolio.  Thus far there has been relatively 
little acknowledgement of this, and it will be 
interesting to see whether there becomes a point 
where these trends attract greater attention.
The big change happening to the Scottish budget 
in 2020/21 is the transfer of financial responsibility 
for a further five of the eleven social security 
payments that are being devolved following the 
recommendations of the Smith Commission. 
This will mean that the Scottish Government has 
assumed financial responsibility for 9 of the 11 
payments being devolved by April 2020.
The transfer of financial responsibility exposes the 
Scottish budget to the risk that spending on the 
payments transferred is higher than the increase to 
the Scottish block grant. This is unlikely to happen in 
a significant way in the short run, not least because 
the Scottish Government will only be able to roll out 
new Scottish specific policy gradually over the next 
few years.
But the risks will grow in coming budgets. Spending 
on the devolved payments could increase more 
rapidly than the uplift to the block grant if the 
eligible population (largely consisting of older 
people) grows more quickly in Scotland than in the 
rest of the UK. 
But it could also occur if the Scottish Government 
sets a policy that is more generous than the 
equivalent policy in rUK. The indications are that this 
is the direction of travel the government intends to 
take. 
These are perfectly legitimate policy choices, and it 
is clearly the intention of devolution that it enables 
policy to evolve differently in Scotland. But higher 
spending on the social security payments being 
devolved will mean reduced spending on other 
areas or increases in tax.
What about the outlook for capital spending? 
Last year the Scottish Government announced what 
appeared at the time to be an ambitious aspiration 
to increase capital investment in Scotland by £1.5bn 
by 2025. 
In their Manifesto, the Conservatives said they will 
allow net investment to rise to 3% of GDP (from 
just over 2% currently). This would result in an 
additional £1.7bn (one third) in real terms flowing to 
the Scottish Government to fund capital investment 
in Scotland by 2023/24. On this basis, the Scottish 
Government’s capital investment pledge could be 
met – and then some – without it needing to use its 
capital borrowing powers or more ‘innovative’ forms 
of investment.
Of course we still do not yet know when the Scottish 
budget will be. 
The UK budget is expected to be published in 
February, after the UK has officially left the EU at the 
end of January. An announcement on a specific date 
can be expected soon. 
If the UK budget is published in early February, 
the Scottish budget will probably follow 2-3 weeks 
later, following which there will be an extremely 
short period of parliamentary debate, a truncated 
legislative process, and an expedited process 
of Royal Assent for the Budget Bill (and related 
legislation, including the Scottish Rate Resolution 
on income tax and the Local Government Finance 
Order).
If the UK budget is published later in February, there 
may be no option other than to prepare the Scottish 
budget concurrently, publishing it at around the 
same time. 
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If the UK budget contained any particular surprises 
in terms of spending lines or tax policy, the Scottish 
Government may end up having to amend its budget 
mid-way through a scrutiny or legislative process 
that had already begun.
Beyond the 2020/21 budget itself, the UK 
Government is likely to aim to publish a multi-year 
spending review towards the summer, enabling 
the Scottish Government to follow suit with its own 
spending review, possible in summer.
The hope for many in the public sector will be that 
the Scottish Government finally gets around to 
setting a multi-year spending framework as oppose 
to the more opportunistic decision of recent times to 
simply set one-year budgets.
In the context of the near future outlook however, 
all eyes will be on the publication of the 2018/19 
Scottish income tax outturn data in July. The latest 
forecasts indicate that this outturn figure might be 
‘bad’ for Scotland for two reasons:
 ■ First, because it will indicate (if latest 
forecasts are to be believed) that the Scottish 
income tax base grew relatively weakly in 
2018/19, offsetting any hoped-for boost from 
the income tax policy introduced in Scotland 
that year.
 ■ Second, because this weaker performance 
wasn’t forecast at the time the 2018/19 
budget was set, it effectively means the 
Scottish budget has not yet incurred the 
costs of this weaker tax revenue growth. 
A reconciliation will apply to the 2021/22 
budget to reflect the extent of this forecast 
error.
The big question remain how large this adjustment 
will need to be, which is why the outturn data is 
so important. Indications are that it could be as 
high as £600m. If this is realised, it will create 
some interesting debates in the lead-up to the final 
budget of this parliament.
More generally, the prospect of a Brexit-focussed, 
Boris Johnson-led Conservative government at 
Westminster with SNP dominance in Scotland means 
that constitutional questions will remain dominant 
in the political debate. 
And as well as its principle demand for a further 
independence referendum, its worth remembering 
that the SNP manifesto also called for devolution of 
a number of further economic and fiscal powers. 
These included the devolution of powers over 
migration, devolution of National Insurance 
Contributions and devolution of aspects of 
employment law (including the minimum wage). 
Together with an ongoing debate over what 
should replace various EU funds post-Brexit, it is 
not unlikely that we will spend much of the year 
debating what fiscal and economic powers the 
Scottish Government should be able to exercise 
in future, and relatively less on how the existing 
powers are being used today.
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The Fraser of Allander Institute (FAI) at the University of Strathclyde entered Scottish public life in 
1975. Since then, it has become established as a leading independent economic research institute 
working with a wide range of clients on a variety of different topics.
What we do
For nearly 45 years, the Fraser of Allander (FAI) has been monitoring and commentating on the 
Scottish economy. Our regular publications include:
     ■  FAI Economic Commentary – Quarterly – First published in 1975, our quarterly Economic
Commentary provides the authoritative independent assessment of economic conditions in
Scotland, along with a wide range of economic and policy issues.
     ■  Scottish Business Monitor – Quarterly – Since 1998, the FAI Scottish Business Monitor has been
a key leading indicator of the Scottish economy. This survey of Scottish business sentiment 
provides vital insights into the Scottish economy well in advance of official statistics.
     ■   Labour Market Trends – Semi-annual – Labour Market Trends aims to shed light on key
developments in Scotland’s labour market. Alongside a summary of recent trends and the future 
outlook, the report also highlights longer trend developments and areas for discussion.
     ■  Scotland’s Budget Report – Annual – The Fraser of Allander Institute's analysis of the Scottish
Budget and the choices, risks and opportunities facing the Finance Secretary.  
     ■  Our blog – Launched in 2016, and viewed over 200,000 times, our FAI blog is a keenly watched
discussion platform on the Scottish economy. The blog publishes short reflections on economic
developments as well as the policy debate.
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